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AMIUGUITIES.
I!V THKODORE GILMAN.
"The ambiguity of language, uncertainty of
meaning, vagueness of thought, and confusion
of ancient and figurative speech, underlying
literature and tradition ; the eiTect of amjji-
guity upon customs, laws and creeds."
YoNKERS, April 29, 1904.
TN the fall of 1869 there occurred a public discussion between
^ Dr. Mark Hopkins, President of Williams College, and Dr.
James McCosh, President of Princeton, regarding what Dr. McCosh
called "the very peculiar ethical theory of Dr. Hopkins." It was
a battle between trained champions in the maturity of their powers
and excited wide interest. The chief relation of their discussion
to the above topic is to be found in the difificulty these accomplished
writers and teachers had in understanding each other. Dr. Hop-
kins wrote : "and here I must notice a misapprehension of Dr.
McCosh respecting the place assigned by me to the moral reason.
He says my 'confusion arises from making the moral reason come
after the end, after the end has been chosen.' I not only do not do
this, but it never occurred to me as possible that any one should."
The chief characteristic of Dr. Hopkins's style was clearness
and cogency of thought, and yet here in a studied and deliberate
controversy, after carefully weighing his words. Dr. McCosh com-
pletely misunderstood him.
In closing the discussion Dr. Hopkins wrote, "But enough, all
metaphysical points lie within a narrow compass, and it is both
amtising and annoying to me to sec what a fog of discussion, and
often lUDibus. will gather roimd them. Those involved in this dis-
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cussion seem to me simple and luminous. Most of the difficulty in
making them appear so to others arises from the imperfection of
language. This has seemed to me so great, that for years 1 was
deterred from attempting anything. I saw so much on these subjects
of mere logomachy. This has been a difficulty between Dr. McCosh
and myself. We evidently do not always attach the same meaning
to the same word. If we could do that, I am confident it would
bring us nearer together than we have seemed, for not only are all
the intuitions of men on these subjects alike, but he and I belong
to the same general school of thought, and are substantially working
together." This discussion is an example of a class which seems
to have been coexistent with language, the two contestants were
skilled logicians, and yet the ambiguities of language were a con-
stant stumbling-block in their way.
Few men have excelled Dr. Hopkins in lucidity of state-
ment and clear thinking. The difficulty which deterred him from
writing for publication may have been the cause of his great atten-
tion to definitions. His whole method in writing seems to have
been the avoidance of ambiguity, uncertainty of meaning, vague-
ness of thought and confusion of figurative speech.
Nor do expert readers of an author get the same meaning from
his words. As an example, Professor E. B. McGilvary writes in
a late number of Alind as follows : "As I understand Hegel, he
affirms exactly what his commentator (W. I. Harris) denies. And
those who read Hegel's monism into a system in which there is no
liberty, except the one single liberty of the one single whole, make
Hegel do violence to the fundamental law of the totalitv of each
logical distinction, a law which he himself made central within his
system." Here two students read an author and come to exacth-
opposite conclusions as to his meaning.
It is said "Language afifords one of the most intricate instances
of creation by consensus gciitiiiiii, and hence presents a field for
astute sociological analysis. Now the word sociology may be
stretched to cover everything in the heavens above, or the earth be-
neath, or be limited to apply to some narrow part of the universal
field. Analysis of a word with reference to the science of sciences,
it must be confessed, does require the gift of astuteness. Did not
the writer mean that the analysis of language requires all the knowl-
edge one possesses, or in other words, are not many high sounding
words used because they are mouth-filling rather than mind-satis-
fying ?
Or to take another example. Herbert Spencer in his Social
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Statics, says. "If \vc would keep cnir conclusions from ambiguities.
we must reserve the term we employ to signify absolute rectitutle
solely for this ])urpose." \'es. but the am])iguity docs not reside in
the term, 1)ut in the meaning we give to it. W'e could conduct a
long discussion using the term, and at the end find that our op])o-
nent understood "absolute rectitude" in a dilTercnt sense from that
in which we did.
What different meanings Dr. Hopkins and Herbert Spencer
would atttach to absolute rectitude. ( )ne might have a human stand-
ard, the either a divine. The only way to prevent ambiguit\- in the
use oFthis or any other term, is to define it. That requires a long-
discussion .and the presentation of arguments and other definitions,
and the statement of philosophies and their histories. The result
would be a disagreement as to the meaning, and an agreement onlv
that each would use the term in their own way. and with their own
meaning. Idiat by itself would be a great advantage. There is sure
to be a misunderstanding b_\' avoiding the question in an (/(/ cap-
ta)idii))i way.
Sa}'s I^rofessor Ritchie, "When people talked to Socrates of
'just' and 'noble.' 'unjust" and 'ignoble,' ])raising" or blaming people
or deeds, he insisted on asking them to explain such words. The
average man thinks he understands them because he is always using
them. Men have a ])icture before their imagination of certain cases,
and they think that is a knowledge of the subject. Such a refer-
ence to cases does not satisfy Socrates. He is not satisfied unless
he can obtain a definition of justice or temperance or friendship
that will fit every case. He starts with some traditional opinion,
and then proceeds to test it by taking concrete instances, and see-
ing whether they come under the accepted formula. This is the
Socratic method." That is. he would avoid ambiguities by a course
of dialectics.
Ambiguities may be said to be the result of dialectics. The
keen and trained logician analyzes his oi)ponents' words and argu-
ments, and discovers their ambiguities and confusions of thought.
From Socrates down to modern ])hilosophers. the work of the
learned has been to force upon their fellow' men a conviction of their
ignorance, and to expose their false conceit of the possession of
larger knowledge. Thus each successive school of thought has its
own terminolog}'. To understand any system or science we must
first learn the language of its teachers. How true this is of Kantism.
Idealists, nominalists, conceptnalists, theologians, and philosoj)hers
of all sorts, have each their language. Chemistry, botany, medicine,
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surgery, and every technical trade, have each their special terminol-
ogy. We thus find many artificial systems of phrases and words
used to describe ideas and facts.
One of the most popular words of modern times and one con-
cerning which there is great ambiguity of meaning is "evolution."
Some understand it to mean necessarily a slow process of develop-
ment which requires millions of years for its completion. Others
say that time is not the essence of its meaning ; it rests chiefly on the
materialistic theory, and requires that the power of development
shall inhere in the matter, and therein is the potency which sets in
motion all the phenomena of nature. Others say that evolution
means that the forms of life have been orderly and continuous, and
whether the time of their development has been short or long, or
whether the progress has been per sal tit in or gradual, does not enter
into the idea. Others that it means the survival of the fittest, and
others natural selection. Others say evolution dispenses with God,
others that evolution is God's method of creation. Questions there-
fore about evolution, and about other subjects also, are exceedingly
difficult to answer without ambiguity.
A categorical answer to a question, yes or no, is often demanded
by practical men. Frequently such an answer would be ambiguous,
and create confusion of thought. You are asked whether you believe
in this or that statement or theory or doctrine. Then you are pushed
into a corner by being asked to assent to some deduction from the
position vour categorical answer seems to require you to take, and
yet which you dissent from, though consistency seems to demand
your assent to it. The contest in such cases should be made on the
question, because it generally contains words or thoughts which are
susceptible of dififerent interpretations, and concerning which there
is doubt as to which view is reasonable and true. The one who
asks the questions is the attacking party, and has the advantage
over the one questioned, who is on the defensive. The questioner
assumes the chief point which is that his questions are based on
acknowledged fact, and are a fair and complete statement of what
should be taken as the true starting-point in the discussion, whereas
the true starting-point is back of the question, and many things
should be said and discussed before the question is reached. Put-
ting the question should come after the discussion. Even a child
can ask questions which it is hard for the parent to answer.
So to the question, are you an evolutionist, yes is an extremely
ambiguous answer. The question should rather be, if you are an
evolutionist, what kind of an evolutionist are you? for if you say
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ves to the simple question, you are liable to be classed by some as
an avowed infidel and materialist. The only way to escape ambi-
guity in using the word evolution, is to define the sense in which
you are using it, whether general or specific, and it the latter, then
give the special meaning you attach to the word.
Another modern ambiguous term is "natm-al selection." ddie
meaning given to it depends upon the school of thought to which
one belongs. It may be taken to mean selection by nature, or as
Darwin expressed it, the selection by a shepherd to imj)rove the
fiocks under his care. That involves a being dilTcrcnt trom the
sheep, controlling them to attain a result of wdiich the\ have no
understanding or apprehension. This being acts with an intelligence
wdiich the sheep have no participation in. That is one meaning of
natural selection. Another is that there is in matter a natural,
though blind, force which determines the selection without the inter-
ference or help of any outside power. The selection under this view-
is one of the attributes of matter, and starting with the atom, it has
progressed bv chemical and other changes, until graduall\ the higher
forms of creation and finally man, have been produced. The am-
biguity of this term thus becomes apparent, and unless one carefully
defines the sense in which it is used, great confusion of thought
must result.
Confusion of thought is apt to arise in translating from one
language to another. Professor Ritchie says, 'Tt is clearly wrong
to call Plato's ideas 'things.' The necessities of language unfortu-
nately compel us to interpolate this word in translating Greek neuter
adjectives and participles, to, ovrm ovra are not properly 'things
in themselves.' " And in another place he says, 'Tf we ask our-
selves in what sense a law of nature is real, we have perhaps the
best clue to the meaning, and also to the ambiguities of Platonic
language. The word real is ambiguous. 'Exist' is always apt to
suggest existence in time and space. The Greek word etvat, 'to be,'
had alwavs the twofold meaning of existence and of validity and
truth. 'Most really existent' is a less accurate translation of to.
ovTcos ovra than 'most thoroughly true and valid.' " And in another
place, "Apart from the misunderstandings likely to result from too
literal an acceptance of Plato's occasional use of. highly figurative
language, it must be admitted that Plato led people to think of the
intelligible realm as another world alongside of the phenomenal."
Oliver Wendell Tlolmes said that in every conversation between
two persons there were six who took part. There was the imaginary
person, wdiom the first person in the dialogue thought himself to
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be. second the imaginary being whom the first person thought the
second person considered him to be, then there was the true person
who might have been very different from both the conceptions re-
garding him. The second person in the dialogue was hkewise three-
fold, and in the conversation words might be spoken in the char-
acter of either of the six. The first person might utter some lofty
sentiment which in his sleeve he rather laughed at. He said it only
because he thought it was such a sentiment as he thought the second
person would expect to come from such a person as the first person
thought the second person thought he was. Or the first person
might say something ///. propria persona, and the second person
would explain it to himself as coming from the person he thought
the first person thought he was. but not coming from the first person
as the second person thought he was. How to get at the true ex-
pression of ideas from both sides of a dialogue without confusion
of thought, is a difficult thing. When mutual confidence exists,
so that each is sure the other is speaking as he truly feels and be-
lieves, there is established the best basis for friendship, trust, and
clearness of thought.
Then there is a class of ambiguities which arise from miscon-
ception and mistakes in the logic of an ignorant person, as when a
woman was asked how she distinguished her twins. She replied
that it was easy enough, she put her finger into Pat's mouth and if
he bit real hard then she knew it was Mike. Or the emotional
speaker who said, changing the first letters of two words, "brethren,
you all know how it feels to have a half warmed fish in your hearts."
There is also a confusion of thought in the term "to eat humble
pie," the word "humble" having been put in the place of the original
word "numble," which is a part of the carcass of a deer, and would
make verv poor pie. The words "humble pie" have the same original
meaning as "to eat crow," a phrase common in political life. There
is an enforced humility in this process, and the change from "numble"
to "humble" introduced a thought which harmonized with the idea
sought to be ex])ressed, and the last form of the phrase has entirely
supplanted the original.
One of the most remarkable words in the history of science is
"phlogiston." Tt. actually did not mean anything. The definitions
of it used seriously by scientific men now provoke a laugh. And yet
the theory of phlogiston was taught in all the universities of Europe
up to the time of the chemical revolution. Then it was discarded
almost unanimously by all scientific men. When the scientific in-
vestigations of Lavoisier revealed the truth as regards the com-
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position of water, the contusion of tliont;ht in the word phloqiston
became apparent.
The revohitionarx' ])eri(»(l in science and llK^n^ht is hke the
nnttation i)eriod in plants. It does not alwax's exist. l)nt when
events conspire to prochice it, tht'u new systems and new species of
thou£iTit and science appear and propag'atc, and maintain themselves
because thev are true, and the confusion of thoui;'ht contained in
the oKl is exposed.
There are intuitions which are comnu)n to all men, hut this is
or(-)un(l (Ml which we should tread carefully. The brain of man is
such a marvelously complex orqan that there are many propositions
which when presented to it 1)\' consci(Misness, are iutuitionall\' ac-
cepted as true. The mind is built u]) by its intuitions and conclu-
sions. Its formation is determined by the kind of propositions it
accepts as intuitions. The mind, however, in the interest of clear
thinking" should be trained to rest not (~)n intuitions onl\', but on
definitions, or rather to test its intuitions by detinitions. In modern
phrase the universe is one intelligible system, of which the human
mind can come to understand some part, just because and in so far
as it applies the test of coherence or non-contraction. The mind
looks at any object presented to it, not only with two eyes but from
a thousand or more standpoints of memory and association. The
mind covers every object with a maze of triangulatic^ns from each
point which it has verified by the base line of cx])erience. Plutarch
ascribes to Plato the saying- "God always g-eometrizes." So truth
ma\" be said to be not a mere matter of personal opinion, but true
to all intelligence. Given one base line of actual well defined truth,
and we can triangulate and explore the entire universe.
The chief duty of every speaker or writer is to make his mean-
ing clear, and this is by no means an easy task. Almost like this is
the duty to think clearly. If these two objects can be attained, the
writer or speaker will render a service to himself and to those who
hear him. Of two words the one should be used about which there
is the least ambiguity, and which has the greatest precision. The
subject to be treated should be defined, and the sense in \\iJiich
topical words arc used, clearly stated. Science began in Greece by
the attempts of philosophers to arrive at the truth by means of defi-
nitions, and like the Corinthian pillars, those early Greek nxxlels
are never to be surpassed.
There is yet a word to be said on the eH\'ct of ambiguity on
customs, laws, and creeds. The frontispiece of the last Open Court,
by C. Goldsborough-Anderson represents an old man reclining on
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his bed ; his white beard ean hardly be cHstinguished from the cover-
let ; his erect head is fring'ed with snow white hair, making- most
prominent the massive development of his brain. Though lying on
his last bed, his eyes have lost none of their keenness and his face
beams with intellig'cnce and kindliness. On one side, his aged wife
is looking tenderly into his face. ( )n the other his daughter lies
prostrate with her emotions, her face buried in her hands. At the
foot of the bed, facing the old man. kneels a priest holding up to
his gaze a crucifix.
The story is told. The church with its authority and the wife
and daughter with all the power of their tender love and religious
devotion are urging the man of science to recant. How can he re-
cant when he has reached his positions by processes as inexorable
as those of geometry, and when he knows that if words were only
rightly understood, all confusion of thought would vanish in the
clear light of truth.
